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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to deal with interactions between envy, economic growth
and income and wealth distribution in a heterogeneous-household growth model with
economic structure. With regards to envy and its impact, this study is influenced by
the economic model with envy by Gershman (2014). We deal with the (destructive)
role of envy on labor supply, time distribution between labor and destructive activities,
and wealth and income distribution. The model is framed in a general dynamic general
equilibrium theory. The economic structure composes of one consumer goods sector and
one capital goods sector. The motion is described by a set of differential equations. We
simulate the movement of a three-group economy with endogenous envy. We carry out
comparative dynamic analysis to show how envy and other exogenous changes affect
transitory processes and equilibrium structure of the economy.
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Envidia y Desigualdad en el Ingreso y Riqueza en una Teoría del
Equilibrio General Dinámico
Resumen
El objetivo de este estudio es abordar las interacciones entre la envidia, el crecimiento
económico y la distribución del ingreso y la riqueza en un modelo de crecimiento hete-
rogéneo de los hogares con estructura económica. En cuanto a la envidia y su impacto,
este estudio está influenciado por el modelo económico con envidia de Gershman (2014).
Nos ocupamos del papel (destructivo) de la envidia en la oferta de mano de obra, la dis-
tribución del tiempo entre el trabajo y las actividades destructivas, y la distribución de
la riqueza y el ingreso. El modelo se enmarca en una teoría general del equilibrio general
dinámico. La estructura económica se compone de un sector de bienes de consumo y un
sector de bienes de capital. El movimiento se describe mediante un conjunto de ecuacio-
nes diferenciales. Simulamos el movimiento de una economía de tres grupos con envidia
endógena. Realizamos análisis dinámicos comparativos para mostrar cómo la envidia y
otros cambios exógenos afectan los procesos transitorios y la estructura de equilibrio de
la economía.
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1. Introduction
In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith (1776) introduced the impact of envy on wealth
distribution as follows: “The aﬄuence of the rich excites the indignation of the poor,
who are often both driven by want, and prompted by envy, to invade his possessions.”
Although envy and constrictive and destructive activities associated with envy have been
examined from different perspectives by scholars in varied fields, it may be argued that
there are only a few economic studies which formally examine dynamics of envy and its
impact on inequalities in income and wealth over time.
This study deals with interactions between envy and economic growth in dynamic
general equilibrium theory. There are some studies on the economics of envy. Normative
aspects of envy were examined by economists in welfare economics long time ago (Varian,
1974; Baumol, 1987). Behavioral implications of envy are studied by, for instance, Banerjee
(1990) and Kirchsteiger (1995). Brennan (1973) examines how non-altruistic individuals
can be motivated by envy to promote redistribution programs as the individuals value
reducing the rich’s consumption. Banerjee (1990) examines how progressive taxation may
be promoted to correct the distortions created by envy. Mui (1995) analyzes the economics
of envy in the standard economic choice framework. The model examines how agents’
innovating, retaliating, sabotaging, and sharing behavior are determined by propensities
for envy and other factors. As far as introduction of envy into formal economic modelling
is concerned, this study is specially inspirited by a recent publication by Gershman (2014).
In the Gershman model, if there are scarce investment opportunities, large inequalities,
and insecure property rights, the economic system may be located in a fear equilibrium
where richer agents underinvest because of fearing destructive factors due to envy of
the poor. Otherwise, the economy follows the traditional “keeping up with the Joneses”
competition where envy is satisfied with high efforts. This study emphasizes destructive
side of envy and examines how destructive activities interact with dynamics of growth
and income and wealth distribution.
This paper studies interactions between envy and economic growth in a general eco-
nomic growth theory developed by Zhang. Zhang’s theory is an integration of Walrasian
general equilibrium theory and neoclassical growth theory with Zhang’s utility function
and concept of disposable income (Zhang, 2012, 2013). Walrasian general equilibrium
theory was proposed by Walras and then generalized by many others (e.g., Walras, 1874;
Arrow and Debreu, 1954; Debreu, 1959; Arrow and Hahn, 1971; and Mas-Colell et al.,
1995). With regard to contemporary dynamic theory, the general equilibrium theory fails
to properly analyze dynamics of stock variables, such as physical capital and human ca-
pital, with heterogeneous households. (e.g., Morishima, 1964, 1977; Jensen and Larsen,
2005; Montesano, 2008; Impicciatore et al., 2012). On the other hand, neoclassical growth
theory is mainly concerned with dynamics of stock variables. Nevertheless, different from
general equilibrium theory, neoclassical growth theory is weak at dealing with distribu-
tion issues among heterogeneous households (e.g., Solow, 1956; Burmeister and Dobell,
1970; and Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). Zhang (2012, 2013) has recently made efforts in
building a general economic theory by integrating the economic mechanisms of Walrasian
general equilibrium theory and neoclassical growth theory with applying Zhang’s utility
and concept of disposable income. This study applies Zhang’s theoretical framework to
study dynamic interdependence between envy, wealth and income distribution between
heterogeneous groups (Zhang, 2012, 2013). The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we build the heterogeneous-household growth model with endogenous wealth and income
distribution and with destructive activities of envy. In Section 3, we study dynamic
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properties of the envy-influenced economy and simulates dynamics of a three-group eco-
nomy. In Section 4, we carry comparative dynamic analysis to show effects of changes
in some parameters on transitory progresses and economic equilibrium. In Section 5, we
conclude the study.
2. The Basic Model
The model developed in this section is built on Zhang (2013). Following the Uzawa two-
sector model (Uzawa, 1961; Burmeister and Dobell 1970), we assume that the economy
composes of capital goods and consumer goods sectors. The population is classified in-
to multiple groups. Group j’s fixed population is denoted by N¯j (j = 1, . . . , J). We call
a representative household from group j as household j Households own assets of the
economy. Saving is conducted only by households. Households use up their disposable
income for consuming and saving. All markets are perfectly competitive. We apply Tj (t)
to symbolize the work time of household j. We measure prices in terms of capital goods.
We choose the price of the commodity to be unity. The wage rate of worker j is denoted
by wj (t). The rate of interest and the price of consumer goods are denoted by r (t) and
p (t), respectively. The total capital stock K (t) is employed by the two sectors and is used
for destructive activities. Let subscript index, i and s symbolize capital goods sector and
consumer goods sector, respectively. We apply Nm (t) and Km (t) to represent the labor
force and capital stocks employed by sector m. Variables Fm (t) represent output level of
sector m. We have the total population N¯ and total qualified labor supply N(t) as follows:
N¯ =
∑J
j=1 N¯j , N (t) =
∑J
j=1 hjTj (t) N¯j (1)
in which hj is the human capital of group j. The assumption of labor force being fully
employed implies:
Ni (t) +Ns (t) = N (t) (2)
The capital goods sector
We specify the production function of the capital goods sector as follows:
Fi (t) = AiK
αi
i (t)N
βi
i (t) , αi, βi > 0, αi + βi = 1 (3)
where Ai, αi, and βi are the total factor productivity, and the output elasticities of
capital and labor, respectively. Let (0 < δk < 1) symbolize the constant depreciation rate
of capital. We have the following marginal conditions for the sector:
r (t) + δk =
αiFi(t)
Ki(t)
, w (t) = βiFi(t)Ni(t) (4)
in which w (t) implies the wage rate of labor. We have the wage rate for group j as
follows:
wj (t) = hjw (t) .
The per household’s wage income Wj (t) is
Wj (t) = hjTj (t)w (t) (5)
The consumer goods sector
We specify the production function of the sector as:
Fs (t) = AsK
αs
s (t)N
βs
s (t) , αs + βs = 1, αs, βs > 0, (6)
in which Ai, αi, and βi are the total factor productivity, and the output elasticities of
capital and labor, respectively. We have the marginal conditions as follows:
r (t) + δk =
αsp(t)Fs(t)
Ks(t)
, w (t) = βsp(t)Fs(t)Ns(t) (7)
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Zhang’s Current income and disposable income
We apply the approach to modelling household behavior proposed by Zhang (1993, 2005).
We apply k¯j(t) to symbolize the value of wealth owned by household j. Let K¯j(t) stand for
the total value of wealth held by group j. According to the definitions, k¯j(t) = K¯j(t)/N¯j
holds. Household j’s current income composes of the wage income and the interest payment
as follows:
yj (t) = r (t) k¯j(t) +Wj(t)
Different from the traditional concept of disposable income (which is the current in-
come in Zhang’s approach), we calculate household j’s disposable income as the sum of
the current income and the value of wealth:
yˆj (t) = yj (t) + k¯j(t) (8)
Description of envy and its impact
With regards to envy and its impact, we base our approach on the model with envy in
discrete time by Gershman (2014). In Gershman’s approach, the population over time is
a sequence of non-overlapping generations, each generation living for one period. Each
agent has a unit of time. Let K stand for the total endowment of the economy, which is
assumed to be constant over time. The population is classified into the rich and poor.
The wealth is distributed as follows: Kp = λK and Kr = (1− λ)K, where λ is the given
distribution parameter. Each agent allocates the available time between producing and
disruption of the other agent’s process. The destructive activity is due to envy. If agent i
allocates a fraction dit of his time to disrupt the productivity of agent j, the latter retains
only a fraction pjt of his final output
pjt =
1
1+τdit
, i 6= j
where τ is a parameter measuring the effectiveness of destructive technology. The
utility function is specified as follows
Uit =
(Cit−θCjt)1−σ
1−σ − Lit
where Lit is work time and θ and σ are positive and less than one parameters.
Inspirited by Gershman’s approach and some other models on envy, we assume that
destructive technology fjq (t) is
fjq (t) = Ajqk
αjq
jq (t)T
βjq
jq (t) , j 6= q, j, q = 1, ..., J, αjq, βjq > 0, αjq + βjq = 1 (9)
where Ajq are parameters, Tjq (t) and kjq (t) are the time and the capital stock that
household j uses to destroy wealth of household q. It is assumed that household q loses
its wealth due to group j’s envy in the following way:
f¯qj(t) = θjqfjq (t) k¯q(t), j, q = 1, ..., J (10)
where θjq ≡ N¯j/N¯q. This implies that per household loss is proportional to the per
household wealth and the disruption that the representative household receives. From the
definitions we should require
θjqfjq (t) ≤ 1, j 6= q, j, q = 1, ..., J
This implies that one should not lose what one owns. According to (10), group j’s per
household total loss due to all the destructive activities of the society is
f¯j(t) =
∑J
m6=j f¯jm(t), j = 1, ..., J (11)
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We assume a simplified form of possible disruption as envy can be conducted through
different channels on various people. For instance, there may be “joint productions” in
destructive activities in the sense that one action may have destructive effects on different
groups. For simplicity, we are only concerned with destructive sides of envy. Envy and its
destructive impact are related to various variables such as family background, individual
human capital, education, social environment, education, networks and relations with
celebrities, relative richness in group (Gershman, 2013). By the way our approach can also
deal with other variables such as sympathy or hatred. If a rich group has strong sympathy
towards the poor, it is possible for the rich to make efforts to help the poor. In our
approach, this can be dealt with by taking Ajq as a negative number and making proper
adjustments in the rest of the model. Taxation by the government may be technically
considered as a special form of sympathy. Hatred may be modelled similarly as envy.
Budget constraints with destructive activities
The disposable income is used for saving and consumption. The representative household
from group j would distribute the total available budget between savings sj (t), consumer
goods cj (t), and capital for destructive actions. The household also loses wealth due to
destructive activities of the society. The budget constraint means
p (t) cj (t) + (r (t) + δk)
∑J
m 6=j kjm (t) + sj (t) + f¯j(t) = yjt (12)
Let T0j stand for the total available time that each household from group j has for work
and destructive activities. The available time is distributed between work and destructive
activities
Tj (t) +
∑J
q 6=j Tjq (t) = T0j (13)
Insert (13) in (8)
yˆj (t) = yjt− hjwtmjJTjqt (14)
in which
y¯j(t) ≡ (1 + r (t)) k¯j(t) + hjw (t)T0j − f¯j(t)
Substitute (13) in (11)
p (t) cj (t) + (r (t) + δk)
∑J
m 6=j kjm (t) + hjw (t)
∑J
m 6=j Tjq (t) + sj (t) = y¯j(t)
Envy and Utility functions
It is assumed that utility level Uj (t) is related to variables cj (t) , sj (t) and fjq (t) as
follows:
Uj (t) = c
ξj0
j (t) s
λj0
j (t)
∏J
q 6=j f¯
ωjq0
jq (t), ξj0, λj0 > 0, ωjq0 ≥ 0 (15)
in which ξj0 represents the propensity to consume consumer goods, λj0 the propensity
to save, and ωjq0 is group j’s propensity to destroy group q’s property. It should be noted
that in the theoretical literature of economic growth and development, most of formal
models is built on the Ramsey approach to household behavior. The heterogeneity between
households is assumed due to differences in initial endowments of wealth rather than in
preferences (e.g., Caselli and Ventura, 2000; and Turnovsky and Penalosa, 2006). This
approach in the traditional approach explains, at least partly, why modern growth theories
have little to say about implications of heterogeneity in households’ preferences. Zhang’s
approach is an alternative approach to the traditional approaches, which make it possible
to deal with different issues of economic growth and development with heterogeneous
households.
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Maximizing utility
Maximizing utility
p (t) cj (t) = ξj y¯j (t) , sj (t) = λj y¯j (t) , (r (t) + δk) kjq (t) = α˜jq y¯j(t), hjw (t)Tjq (t)
=β˜jq y¯j(t) (16)
where
ξj ≡ ρjξj0, λj ≡ ρjλj0, α˜jq ≡ αjqρjωjq0, β˜jq ≡ βjqρjωjq0, ρj ≡ 1ξj0+λj0+∑Jq 6=j ωjq0
Wealth accumulation
The change in wealth is equal to saving minus dissaving
k¯j(t) = sj(t)− k¯j(t) (17)
Equilibrium conditions for the two sectors
For the consumer goods sector, we have∑J
j=1 cj (t) N¯j = Fs (t) (18)
For capital goods market, output of the capital goods sector is used up for the depre-
ciation of capital stock and the net savings. We thus have
S (t)−K (t) + δkK (t) = Fi (t) (19)
in which
S (t) ≡∑Jj=1 sj (t) N¯j ,K (t) = ∑Jj=1 k¯j (t) N¯j
Full employment of capital
The two sectors and destructive activities fully use up the total capital stock K (t)
Ki (t) +Ks (t) +
∑J
j=1Kj (t) = K (t) (20)
in which Kj (t) represent the capital stocks that group j uses for destructive activities
Kj = N¯j
∑J
q 6=j kjq (t) (21)
We built the model. The model is structurally general in the sense that we can consi-
der some well-known models, such as the Solow one-sector growth model (Solow, 1956),
the Uzawa two-sector growth model (Uzawa, 1961), and Walrasian general equilibrium
theory, in economic growth theory as its special cases. The new aspect of this study is
the introduction of envy into neoclassical growth theory with heterogeneous households.
3. Dynamic properties of the envy-influenced growth model
As the dynamic system contains many variables and these variables are nonlinearly inter-
related, it is difficult to obtain analytically dynamic properties of the model. Nevertheless,
we now show that we can follow the movement of the system by simulation. Before stating
the main result of this section, we define the following variables:
z (t) ≡ r(t)+δkw(t) ,
{y¯j (t)} ≡ (y¯2 (t) , · · · , y¯J (t))
We also use Ωj (t) to stand for unique functions of z (t) and {y¯j(t)} and these functions
are defined in the Appendix. For simplicity of analysis, it is assumed that the richest group
(group 1 as specified in simulation) does not to envy any other group and hence conducts
no destructive activity. That is A1q = ω01q = 0, for any q. Nevertheless, the rich group
may suffer losses from other groups’ destructive activities.
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Lemma
The following J differential equations determine motion of the economic system:
z˙ (t) = Ω1 (z (t) , {y¯j (t)}) ,
j(t) = Ωj (z (t) , {y¯j (t)}) , j = 2, ..., J (22)
The other variables are uniquely related to z (t) and y¯j(t) as follows: r (t) and wj (t)
with (A2) (t) with (A3)→ y¯1(t) from (A19)→ k¯j(t) from (A12)→ K (t) =
∑J
j=1 k¯j(t)N¯j →
cj (t), sj (t) , kjq (t), and Tjq (t) from (16) → Tj (t) with (13) (t) from (1) → w (t) =
w1 (t) /h1 → Kj (t) with (A5) → Ns (t) from (A4) → Ni (t) from (A7) → Ks (t) and
Ki (t) with (A1) → Fi (t) andFs (t) by the definitions → fjq (t) from (A9) → f¯jq(t) by
(A10)→ f¯j(t) by (A12).
From the computational procedure in the Lemma we determine the motion of the
economic system. Simulation can be easily conducted for any number of households as we
already provide the computational procedure. We now consider a three-group economy.
The parameter values of the envy-influenced growth model are specified as follows:
Ai = 1,3, As = 1, αi = 0,34, αs = 0,3, T0 = 8, δk = 0,05,N¯1N¯2
N¯3
 =
 550
100
 ,
h1h2
h3
 =
62
1
 ,
λ10λ20
λ30
 =
 0,90,8
0,73
 ,
ξ10ξ20
ξ30
 =
 0,10,17
0,22
 ,(ω210
ω230
)
=(
0,02
0,01
)
,
(
ω310
ω320
)
=
(
0,03
0,02
)
,
(
A21
A23
)
=
(
A31
A32
)
=
(
0,1
0,1
)
,
(
α21
α23
)
=
(
α31
α32
)
=
(
0,3
0,3
)
(23)
We assume the population of group 3 to be largest and the population of group 2 the
next. We specify he capital goods and consumer goods sector’s total productivities 1.3 and
1, respectively. The values of the parameters αj are approximately 0.3. The depreciation
rate of physical capital is specified at 0.05. The initial conditions are
z (0) = 0,095, k¯2 (0) = 97, k¯3 (0) = 55
The motion of the variables is plotted in Figure 1. In Figure 1, the national income is
Y (t) = Fi (t) + p (t)Fs (t)
The national output, total labor supply and national wealth fall from the initial condi-
tions over time. The output level of the capital goods sector is reduced, while the output
level of the consumer goods sector is enhanced. The rate of interest rises as the wage rates
fall. The price of consumer goods is reduced. Group 1’s per capita wealth, per capita con-
sumption, and wealth are reduced by the other two groups’ destructive activities against
group 1. Nevertheless, as group 1 has less wealth, the other two groups’ destructive acti-
vities become less effective. Group 2’s per capita wealth and consumption levels almost
not changed. Group 3’s per capita wealth and consumption levels rise. The envy reduces
the wealth gaps between group 1 and other two groups. The jealous groups work less and
spend more time on destructive activities.
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Figure 1. The Movement of the Envy-Influenced Economy
Figure 1 shows the existence of equilibrium point. We find the equilibrium values as
follows:
Y = 3449,2,K = 8063,1, N = 1597,9, r = 0,105, p = 1,38, w1 = 8,84, w2 = 2,95,
w3 = 1,47, Fi = 1524,9, Fs = 1394,1, Ni = 683,3, Ns = 914,6,Ki = 3348,2,
Ks = 3728,1,K2 = 481,4,K3 = 505,4, T2 = 6,82, T21 = 0,71, T23 = 0,47, T3 = 6,76,
k¯1 = 55,7, k¯2 = 79,5, k¯3 = 38,1, c1 = 4,48, c2 = 10,8, c3 = 8,3, k21 = 5,78, k23 = 3,85,
T31 = 0,74, T32 = 0,50, k31 = 3,03, k32 = 2,03, f1 = 70,3, f2 = 12,02, f3 = 1,69. (24)
We solve the three eigenvalues as follows:
{−0,96,−0,26,−0,19} .
The three real and negative eigenvalues. The equilibrium point is locally stable. This
guarantees the validity of comparative dynamic analysis.
4. Comparative Dynamic Analysis
The previous section plotted the movement of the envy-influenced economy under (23). We
now apply the computational procedure from the Lemma to make comparative dynamic
analysis. This enables us to know effects of anon transitory processes and equilibrium.
We use a variable xjt to represent the change rate of the variable, xj (t), in percentage
caused by a change in the parameter.
4.1. The middle class enhance its destructive efficiency against the
rich
We now consider the case that the middle strengthens its destructiveness against the
rich due to envy as follows: A21 : 0,1 ⇒ 0,012. Figure 2 plots the simulation result. As
the middle class more effectively destroys the rich’s wealth, the national wealth, income
and labor supply are all decreased. The rate of interest is increased. The wage rates fall.
The capital goods sector produces more output initially but finally reduces output level.
The sector employs more labor and capital inputs initially but less in the long term. The
consumer goods sector produces less output, and employ less labor and capital inputs.
The rich lose more by the middle class’s destructive activities but less by the poor. The
rich have less wealth and consume less consumer goods. The rich lose more wealth initially
and loses less then. The middle class and the poor lose less wealth due to their destructive
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activities. Both the middle class and poor work less and use more times on destroying
the others’ wealth. The middle class consume more consumer goods and own less wealth.
The poor finally consume more consumer goods and have more wealth.
Figure 2. The Middle Class Enhance the Destructive Efficiency against the Rich
4.2. The middle class enhance the propensity to destroy the rich’s
wealth
We now study the impact of a change in the middle class’s propensity to destroy the rich’s
wealth as follows: ω210 : 0,02 ⇒ 0,022. The simulation result is illustrated in Figure 3.
Similar to the previous case when the middle class improves its destructiveness efficiency,
the national wealth, income and labor supply are reduced. The rate of interest rises and
the wage rates fall. Different from the previous case, both the capital goods and consumer
goods sectors’ output levels and labor and capital inputs fall over time. The rich lose more
due to the middle class’s destructive activities but less due to the poor. The rich have
less wealth and consume less consumer goods. The rich lose more wealth due to the
destructive activities initially and there is almost no change in losses in the long term.
Both the middle class and the poor lose less due to the destructive activities. Both the
middle class and poor work less and use more times in destroying the others’ wealth.
The middle class consume less consumer goods and have less wealth. The middle class
spend more time on destroying the rich’s wealth and less time on the poor’s. The poor
spend more time on destroying the middle class and do not change the time on the rich.
The poor consume more consumer goods and have more wealth in the long term. We see
that by strengthening its envy against the rich, in terms of consumption and wealth the
middle class and the rich suffer and the poor benefit. This also implies that the inequality
gaps between the rich and the poor are reduced. It should be noted that in modelling an
economy with overlapping generations and heterogeneous agents, Alvarez-Cuadrado and
Long (2012: 949) find out: “envy reduces the steady-state capital stock and increases the
degree of inequality in consumption, capital ownership, and bequests”. Our simulation
shows that a strengthened envy from a group reduces the national wealth, reduces some
groups’ wealth and increases others’ wealth.
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Figure 3. The Middle Class Enhance the Propensity to Destroy the Rich’s Wealth
4.3. The middle class’s human capital is improved
We now study the case that the middle class’s human capital is changed as follows:
h2 : 2⇒ 2,2. We summarize the simulation result Figure 4. The national wealth, income
and labor supply are increased. The rate of interest is increased. We have higher wage
rate of the middle class, but almost same wage rates for the other two classes. Both the
capital goods and consumer goods sectors’ output levels and labor and capital inputs are
enhanced over time. The rich’s loss in wealth due to the middle class’ and the poor’s
destructive activities rise initially and finally fall slightly. The rich’s consumption is in-
creased initially and reduced in the long term. The rich’s wealth falls. The middle class
spend less time and use more capital on destructive activities both against the rich and
the poor. The middle class’ wealth loss is increased as the class becomes wealthy. In the
long term the wealth losses of the rich and the poor are slightly affected by the middle
class’s human capital improvement. The middle class attracts more destructive activities
against the class as it becomes wealthy. In the long term the middle class benefits in terms
of consumption level and wealth and the poor and rich lose.
Figure 4. The Middle Class’s Human Capital Is Improved
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4.4. The middle class increase the propensity to save
We study the case that the middle class augment the propensity to save as follows:
λ20 : 0,8 ⇒ 0,9. The simulation result is summarized in Figure 5. The national wealth,
income and labor supply are increased. The wage rates are enhanced. The rate of interest
is reduced. The price of consumer goods is enhanced. The capital goods sector’s output
levels and labor and capital inputs are enhanced. The consumer goods sector’s output
levels and labor input are reduced. The consumer goods sector’s capital input is reduced
initially and finally increased. The rich lose less due to the middle class and lose more due
to the poor’s destructive activities. The middle and poor spend more time on working
and less time on destructive activities. The rich consume more and own more. The middle
class own more and consume less. The poor consume more. The poor owns less initially
and finally more. The rich and middle class lose more due to the destructive activities
and the poor lose less.
Figure 5. The Middle Class Increase Propensity to Save
4.5. The rich population is increased
We now deal with the case that the rich population is increased as follows: N¯1 : 5 ⇒
6 Figure 6 shows the simulation result. The population change augments the national
wealth, income and labor supply. The wage rates fall. The rate of interest is increased.
The capital goods and consumer goods sectors’ output levels and labor and capital inputs
are enhanced over time. The representative household of the rich loses less due to each
of the two other classes’ destructive activities and loses more in the long term. The rich
and poor households’ consumption and wealth are increased. The middle class and poor
spend less hours on working and more hours on destructive activities.
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Figure 6. The Rich Population Is Increased
4.6. The capital goods sector’s total factor productivity is enhan-
ced
We now study the case that the capital goods sector’s total factor productivity is chan-
ged follows: Ai : 1,3⇒ 1,4. Figure7 shows the simulation result. The national output and
national wealth are augmented. The price of consumer goods is enhanced. The rate of
interest. The wage rates rise. The capital goods sector’s total output and two factor inputs
are increased. The total labor supply rises. The consumer goods sector’s labor is reduced.
The consumer goods sector’s output and capital input are reduced initially and finally
increased. The rich lose more due to each of the other two classes’ attacks. All the three
groups lose more wealth because of the destructive activities in the society. The middle
class and the poor spend more hours on working and less hours on destructive activities.
Everyone finally benefits from the technological improvement in terms of consumption
and wealth.
Figure 7. The Capital Goods Sector’s Total Factor Productivity is Enhanced
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5. Concluding Remarks
This study analyzed dynamic interactions between envy, economic growth and income and
wealth distribution. We built a heterogeneous-household growth model with endogenous
economic structure and envy. The unique contribution of this study is to examine the role
of destructive side of envy on economic structural change and wealth and income distri-
bution. The basic idea about modelling envy was inspirited by the literature of economics
of envy. The motion of the envy-influenced heterogeneous-household is described by dif-
ferential equations. We simulated the motion of a three-group economy. These groups are
called the rich, the middle class, and the poor, respectively. We showed the existence of a
locally stable equilibrium point. We conducted comparative dynamic analysis with regard
to the middle class’s destructive efficiency against the rich, in the middle class’s human
capital, the middle class’s propensity to save, the rich population, and the capital goods
sector’s total factor productivity. We examined how changes in these parameters shift
transitory processes and long-term equilibrium structure. For instance, our simulation
showed that as the middle class increase the propensity to destroy the rich’s wealth, the
effects on the economy are summarized as follows: (i) the national wealth, income and
labor supply being reduced; (ii) the rate of interest is increased and the wage rates are
lowered; (iii) both the capital goods and consumer goods sectors’ output levels and labor
and capital inputs falling over time; (iv) the rich losing more due to the middle class’s
destructive activities but less due to the poor’s destructive activities, the rich having less
wealth and consume less consumer goods; and there being almost no change in losses in
the long term; (v) both the middle class and the poor losing less due to the destructive
activities, both the middle class and poor working less and using more times in destroying
the others’ wealth; (vi) the middle class consuming less consumer goods and having less
wealth; the middle class spend more time on destroying the rich’s wealth and less time on
the poor’s; (vii) the poor spending more time on destroying the middle class and do not
change the time on the rich, and the poor consuming more consumer goods and having
more wealth in the long term; and (viii) in terms of consumption and wealth, the middle
class and the rich suffer and the poor benefit. As our model is built in a very general
analytical framework, we may generalize the model in various directions. For instance, we
may take account of constructive side of envy in our modelling framework.
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Appendix: Checking the Lemma
Equations (4) and (7) imply
z ≡ r+δkw = Niβ¯iKi =
Ns
β¯sKs
(A1)
where β¯j ≡ βm/αm. Insert (A1) in (4)
r = αrz
βi − δk, wj = αwhjz−αi , (A2)
where
αr = αiAiβ¯
βi
i , αw = βiAiβ¯
−αi
i
From (6) and (7), we get
p =
β¯αss z
αsw
βsAs
(A3)
Insert pcj = ξj y¯j in (18)
βs
∑J
j=1 ξjN¯j y¯j = wNs (A4)
where we apply pFs = wNs/βs. From (21) and (r + δk) kjq = α˜jq y¯j in (16), we get
K1 = 0,Kj =
α˜j y¯j
r+δk
, j 6= 1 (A5)
where
α˜1 ≡ 0, α˜j ≡ N¯j
∑J
q 6=j α˜jq, j = 2, ..., J
Insert (A1) and (A5) in (20)
Ni
β¯i
+ Ns
β¯s
+ 1w
∑J
j=2 α˜j y¯j = zK (A6)
Insert (A4) in (A6)
wNi
β¯i
+
∑J
j=1 β˜j y¯j = zwK (A7)
where
β˜j ≡ βsξjN¯jβ¯s + α˜j
With (11) and the definitions of yj, it is straightforward to get
y¯j = (1 + r) k¯j + wjT0j −
∑J
q 6=m,m 6=1 f¯mq (A8)
With (9) and (10) we get
f¯q1 = 0, f¯qj = θjqAjqk
αjq
jq T
βjq
jq kq, j 6= q, j, q = 1, ..., J (A9)
Insert (16) in (A9)
f¯qj = θ˜qj y¯j k¯q, j 6= 1 (A10)
where
θ˜qj = θjqAjq
(
α˜jq
r+δk
)αjq ( β˜jq
hjw
)βjq
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Insert (A8) in (A10)
y¯j + k¯j
∑J
q 6=j,1 θ˜jq y¯q = (1 + r) k¯j + wjT0j , j = 1, ..., J (A11)
If we consider k¯j as the variables in (A11), then the linear equations system have J
variables and J equations. We solve these linear equations as follows:
k¯j = Λj (z, (y¯q)) ≡ y¯j−hjwT0j
1+r−∑Jq 6=j,1 θ˜jq y¯q , j = 1, ..., J (A12)
From (13) and (16) we have
Tj = T0j −Rj y¯j (A13)
where
Rj (z) ≡ 1wj
∑J
q 6=j β˜jq
Insert (A13) in (1)
N = H −∑Jj=1 hjRjN¯j y¯j (A14)
where
H ≡∑Jj=1 hjT0jN¯j
By (2) and (A14) we have
Ni +Ns = H −
∑J
j=1 hjRjN¯j y¯j (A15)
Substitute (A4) and (A7) into (A15)
β¯izK +
∑J
j=1 R˜j y¯j = H (A16)
where
R˜j ≡ βsξjN¯jw + hjRjN¯j − β¯iβ˜jw
Insert K =
∑J
j=1 k¯jN¯j in (A16)
β¯iz
∑J
j=1 k¯jN¯j +
∑J
j=1 R˜j y¯j = H (A17)
Insert (A12) in (A17)
(y¯1−h1wT01)β¯izN¯1
1+r−∑J2 θ˜1q y¯q + R˜1y¯1 = Λ0 (A18)
where
Λ0 (z, {y¯q}) ≡ H −
∑J
j=2 R˜j y¯j − izj = 2Jjz, y¯qN¯j
Solve (A20) with y1 as the variable
y¯1 = Λ (z, {y¯q}) ≡
(
Λ0 +
β¯ih1wT01zN¯1
1+r−∑J2 θ˜1q y¯q
)(
β¯izN¯1
1+r−∑J2 θ˜1q y¯q + R˜1
)−1
(A19)
We determine the variables as functions of z and {y¯j} by the following procedure: r and wj
with (A2) with (A3)→ y¯1 with (A19)→ k¯j with (A12)→ K =
∑J
j=1 k¯jN¯j → cj , sj , kjq,
and Tjq with (16) → Tj with (13) → N with (1) → w = w1/h1 → Kj with (A5) → Ns
with (A4)→ Ni with (A7) → Ks and Ki with (A1) → Fi and Fs with the definitions
→ fjq from (A9) → f¯jq by (A10) → f¯j by (A12). From the procedure, (A12) and (17),
the changes in wealth are given as follows:
522 REMEF (The Mexican Journal of Economics and Finance)
Envy and Inequality in Income and Wealth in a Dynamic General Equilibrium Theory
˙¯kj = Λ˜j (z, {y¯j}) ≡ λj y¯j − Λj , j = 1, ..., J (A20)
Taking derivatives of (A12) in t, we get
˙¯kj =
∂Λj
∂z z˙ +
∑J
j=2
∂Λj
∂y¯j
˙¯yj , j = 1, ..., J (A21)
From (A20) and (A21), we get
∂Λj
∂z z˙ +
∑J
j=2
∂Λj
∂y¯j
˙¯yj = Λ˜j , j = 1, ..., J (A22)
Differential system (A22) has J variables, z and {y¯j} and consists of J linear equations.
It is straightforward to solve (A22)
z˙ = Ω1 (z, {y¯j}) ,
j = Ωj (z, {y¯j}) , j = 2, ..., J (A23)
We confirmed the Lemma.
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